Report of the Euro-Atlantic Association

UKRAINE: CLOSER TO THE WEST

Theses, conclusions, postulates*



Authors:

Dorota Hemi
Maria Wągrowska
Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski


* The full text of the Report with foreword by Bronisław Komorowski is available at the EAA website: www.sea-ngo.org

The Report has been compiled exclusively on the basis of generally accessible reports  and analyses. The authors thank all those who shared with them  their information and reflections. The full version of the Report also contains the opinions of foreign affairs analysts on Ukraine's chances of achieving integration with the EU and NATO: Polish Foreign Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Jacek Kluczkowski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Zdzisław Najder


I. FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF KIEV

1.Viktor Yushchenko's Ukraine

The 26th of December 2004, i.e. the day of the second round of the presidential elections that brought Viktor Yushchenko's triumph, may well pass down in the history of Ukraine as a watershed not only in the domestic politics of our eastern neighbor, but also in European relations. Because of its peculiar internal and external modalities, it may take several years for the impact of the choice made by Ukrainians to become fully evident.

The initiation of democracy-oriented changes, independence in foreign and security policy, and economic development deserves special support - particularly by Poland. Everything possible should be done immediately to harness the momentum that has been introduced into life in Ukraine and the policies toward that country by the Orange Revolution, the election of a new president and his first moves on the international arena.

It would be hard at this point to prejudge Ukraine's future. A whole spectrum of political scenarios is possible: from continuation of the changes started with the victory of Yushchenko's camp - to a radicalization of attitudes, possibly including a political crisis.

One of the crucial tasks internally will consist in maintaining the support of the present electorate at least till the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2006, while working to overcome the encumbrances  of the past. Yushchenko will have to exercise his office with an awareness that 44 per cent of the voters did not support him and do not trust him. That fact should stimulate him to try his best to win support for his platform from half of the nation's citizens - many of whom live in south-eastern Ukraine and tend to be more pro-Russian  than other Ukrainians.

An absence of cohesion in Yushchenko's political base may prove to be a serious barrier when the time comes to take specific decisions. The future of the present coalition is not clear, nor is the degree of support that it will give the president in the future. Yushchenko needs instruments of actual power at his disposal, yet the constitutional amendments introduced as a result of the "round table" (at the initiative of former President Leonid Koutchma, who wanted to reduce the prerogatives of the opposition candidate) could substantially restrict his room for maneuver, hinder his ability to fulfill the hopes of his supporters and lead to confrontation in many spheres of public life - including foreign policy.

That is why Yushchenko has little time to spare. He must move ahead quickly and with determination. Even before the parliamentary elections, he should put internal reforms on track to make them irreversible, and launch a new and credible foreign policy that would envisage integration with the European Union and NATO.

Eradicating the phenomenon of "oligarchization" in public life is one of the conditions for democratizing Ukraine. Today, when exports to Russia account for 18 per cent of all foreign sales - while exports to Europe equal 38 per cent - the oligarchs consider good economic relations with the EU to be in their interest. However, they fear that adaptation to European standards could eventiually undercut their own influence. Still, analysts in Kiev believe that many oligarchs will be willing to accept the changes and more civilized rules of conduct.

There is controversy over the fact that some oligarchs are close to Yushchenko (e.g. secretary of the National Security Council, Petro Proshchenko) and could want to exert influence to protect their own interests.

Pressure by Russia could become another factor impairing reforms. It is not unthinkable that Russia will seek to influence the outcome of the parliamentary poll in 2006. Furthermore, analysts believe that Moscow will always back pro-Russian parties and try to nurture a parallel (Russian) identity in Ukraine. Moscow will do everything to prevent the pro-Russian part of the Ukrainian society from being absorbed by the rest, wanting it to become its natural mainstay. Kiev's inability to control the situation in the entire country would hinder integration with Europe.

2.New relations with the EU and NATO

Priority in Ukraine's foreign policy should be assigned in the foreseeable future to integration with the European Union rather than with the North Atlantic Alliance, even though Ukraine is better prepared (militarily) for membership in NATO, than (economically) - for membership in the EU. Still, a deficit of democracy in the period preceding the last presidential elections was the reason why Ukraine - regardless of any other considerations - could not be considered a state that was well integrated with NATO or the European Union.

European integration has been recognized by the new leadership as a crucial objective. That is determined by Ukraine's development and modernization needs, and also by the fact that closer integration with NATO would probably be more controversial to the people of Ukraine, but also to Russia ( and thus - to the West). However, implementation of that goal - described as a strategic objective - could be a long way off. Yushchenko's team , aware that a long-term process is involved, expects, nevertheless, that Brussels will elaborate a perspective of membership. That would be a priceless political signal, sent in response to the Ukrainian transformations (assuming, of course, that they continue to be consolidated).

"We cannot go into Europe with declarations alone; we must embrace European values and put them into practice. When that happens, we shall not encounter any obstacles on our road to the EU," insists the new president, while Brussels would like to find out more about what he means by closer integration.

The official Kiev realizes that in the case of Ukraine, European integration is doubly difficult. Integration with the EU - which in itself is a highly complex undertaking for a post-communist, retarded country (as compared with EU states), requiring much adaptation effort - should also be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring of the political system and its institutions, major reforms and changes in mentality.

Regardless of the tasks directly connected with the process of integration with the EU, Ukraine requires reforms to ameliorate the country's political system. The constitutional reform is on course, but there is also need for reforming the public administration and local authorities, establishing a stable civil service, building an independent judiciary (the electoral decisions of the Supreme Court created a favorable climate for that), ensuring freedom of expression and the media, and for combating corruption.

Yushchenko is seeking to give Ukraine's relations with the EU a new dimension that will not be determined by strategic foreign policy considerations, but rather - by an objective need to reform and modernize the country in line with European standards. Ukraine's retardation as compared with the rest of Europe is obvious (the level of living standards is estimated at 15 per cent of the EU average), while its economic assets are negligible (with the exception of its 50-million consumer market). Ukraine poses a problem of scale for the European Union.

Ukraine's striving for entry into EU structures should stimulate efforts to acquaint that country with European norms relating to the rule of law, living standards and the economy.

Yushchenko's team has identified the following stages on the road to EU membership:

-recognition of Ukraine as a free market economy;
-admission of Ukraine into the WTO;
-granting to Ukraine of the status of a country associated with the EU;
-full membership.

The new Ukrainian government has to confront the challenge of fully adapting the country's legislation and economy to Union norms. That necessitates:

-The creation of an efficient institutional system for assessing the compatibility of new legislation with European law. The procedure should apply to all draft laws, regardless of who sponsors them (at present, only government drafts are checked for compatibility with the acquis communautaire). In Ukrainian conditions, it could happen that adoption of certain  laws incompatible with the acquis would be desirable, though that certainly should not occur because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the legislators.

-The establishment at central level of an institution coordinating the progress of Ukraine's integration with the EU. Kiev has announced plans for a European integration ministry. Any such institution should be tailored to Ukrainian realities; the experience of other prospective Union members from the so-called Luxembourg and Helsinki groups could be very helpful. It could be useful for Ukraine - as it sets about organizing the ministry - to study the structures and procedures applied in Estonia. They proved exceptionally effective in that post-Soviet country's process of integration, though it should be noted that Estonia is a small country, while Ukraine - as a big country - will have to cope (similarly to Poland) with the problem of scale.

-Intensive training of administration staff - first at the central and later at the regional level - in European integration issues. That will require a new approach to training, the establishment of specialized training centers and cooperation with the appropriate institutions in West European countries.

-Publication of the basic EU documents in the Ukrainian language and introduction of unified terminology and principles of translation of Union documents for the needs of the state administration as well as other interested institutions and individuals.

-Progress in liberalizing the visa regime (up to its ultimate lifting) on the borders with the EU will have to be coupled - as Kiev should realize - with the introduction of effective controls on the remaining borders of the Ukrainian state. That is a serious political issue for Ukraine and the Union - in view of the problems that could arise in relations with states that are not EU members. The Union should extend the appropriate assistance to Kiev.

NATO membership has been moved to the back burner, though the issue remains open. That is indicated by the following considerations:

-All the post-Communist states that have joined the EU or are seeking membership, first became members of NATO (Croatia is the only exception).

-The process of joining NATO is much simpler for a candidate state than accession to the European Communities - and the case of Ukraine is a classic example of that.

-It would be much easier for Ukraine to gain the understanding and support of the US for its integration with NATO, than to obtain the backing of France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain and Germany for its accession to the EU. The Alliance is prone to seeing its reason for existence in the fact that it is still so attractive to the states of Central-Eastern Europe. That is why it is more willing to admit new members.

-Washington is more likely to ignore Moscow's objections than is Brussels, not to mention Paris, Rome or Berlin. Ukraine's entry into Western structures leads to erosion of Russian influence in that country - a trend that the Kremlin is likely to resist.

-NATO has a dominating power - the US, which effectively leads the Alliance, meaning that it is capable of taking a specific decision, pushing it through the relevant bodies, and maintaining support for the policy adopted until it yields the desired effects. The EU does not have such a single center of political will, with the decision-making process based on a group of states with most economic and political clout. As a result, the opening up of the Union to Ukraine means that more member states have to be persuaded first than in the case of NATO, which makes the exercise more difficult.

Numerous Ukrainians, especially the older generation and residents of the eastern regions, have a perception of NATO (as distinct from the EU) that has been shaped by Soviet propaganda. Accordingly, if restoration of unity - undermined by the recent political showdown - is to be one of the main goals of the new president, then it would be politically counter-productive to raise the matter of NATO membership at a time when he seeks to consolidate his power base. That is the likely explanation for the absence of references to NATO integration in the public statements of Yushchenko and his aides. But that merely indicates their political acumen and does not mean that the matter of NATO membership will not come to the fore soon enough. When Ukrainian politicians realize that success in Europe is hard to attain, they may be tempted to look for "compensation" in the relationship with NATO.

And if the previously announced referendum on integration with the Atlantic Alliance does go ahead, the Ukrainians themselves will be better able to define their position vis-ŕ-vis the West.

However, Ukraine must do more than just make declarations on wanting to join NATO. It must demonstrate concrete results in meeting NATO requirements and reforming the whole defense sector.

Leonid Koutchma's administration professed to follow similar goals: integration with the EU and NATO - describing that as its Euro-Atlantic orientation. What, then, is the difference between Kiev's present and previous foreign and security policy? In the past, it was a policy largely limited to declarations. Hopefully, in the present and future it will be a policy filled with substance and marked by concrete steps. And a clearer distinction will be made between integration with the European Union - and with NATO.

The experience of Central Europe, including Poland, indicates that there is no contradiction between seeking NATO membership and joining the European Union. On the contrary, the two processes are mutually complementary. And so, the adoption by the Ukrainian army of NATO standards, including civilian control of the armed forces, constitutes a step toward fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria (stable democracy), which are a key to EU membership. Therefore, the suggestion that Ukraine is in an "either - or" situation corresponds neither to the reality of integration, nor to Ukraine's interests.

Will the success of its reforms, and the diplomatic pressure by Ukraine and sympathetic countries, allow Kiev to convince the EU and NATO to open up prospects of membership?

II. FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE WEST

1 Promises or specifics?

The key question today is: will improvement of the climate between Kiev and Brussels be the only consequence of the victory by the democratic camp candidate, who has made a clearer commitment to integration with the EU and NATO, or will the democratization of Ukraine be translated into concrete proposals for Kiev?

At present, EU and NATO member states do not have a clear, common position on the future status of Ukraine. The Union and the Alliance, divided by various contentious issues, are not coordinating their moves in favor of Kiev. Hence, the great role that can be played by Poland - as a natural ally of Ukraine, and member of both organizations. An independent, stable and strong Ukraine is a crucial element of our country's security.

The accession of a democratic and economically robust Ukraine into the EU and NATO would be in line with present-day logic, especially since there is no direct link between the cohesion and internal condition of the two groupings - and their expansion onto third states.

In the case of Ukraine, a key role may be expected to be played by the ability of the two organizations to admit a new member state - that is the fourth Copenhagen criterion, or article 10 of the Washington Treaty. For, "ability" may be interpreted as "willingness", and "inability" - as "unwillingness". And consideration for Russia may be the implied motive.

It should be remembered that the last round of enlargement of the European Union - with the admission of some countries whose development is dozens of years behind the old members - has caused "fatigue" within the Union, which has to foot the bill for the expansion.

The granting of a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine - or its withholding - will demonstrate if there is political will for admitting Ukraine into NATO.

Any expansion would be significantly influenced by the development of contacts between NATO, the EU and Russia, and the general state of Russia's relations with the US and the major EU countries - particularly France and Germany.

2. The European Union and Ukraine

As could have been expected, a meeting of the Council of the European Union in Brussels on January 31st - the first after Yushchenko took office - failed to take any binding decisions on the future status of that country's relationship with the EU. The EU Council merely expressed support for ten proposals on aid for Ukraine, jointly prepared by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for External Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, envisaging , inter alia, support for Ukraine's WTO membership bid and promising it Market Economy Status as soon as the limited outstanding issues had been satisfactorily resolved. However, no mention was made of association, let alone membership.

The Union is not likely to make a speedy and concrete response to the declarations of the Ukrainian authorities about their striving for integration. Under an optimistic scenario, that could occur only when the reforming and modernization of the Ukrainian state and economy are well under way. So far, Yushchenko is merely a symbol of the anticipated democratization - and not its guarantee. He will become that only when specific reform projects can be successfully coupled with implementation of a national strategy of integration with the EU, that Yushchenko's team wants to put forward.

The authors of this report feel that the adoption by the European Commission on 9th December 2004 of an Action Plan reflected a dated approach to Ukraine.

It is understandable that the AP does not meet the aspirations of the new Ukrainian leadership. However, Kiev's past failures to fully deliver on most - if not all - undertakings made to Brussels indicate that, in any case, Ukraine will have to try its best to fulfill the provisions of the Plan.

The AP does not close the door on deeper integration in the future. However, it is desirable that that the AP be filled with substance and gradually replaced with more advanced forms of cooperation. Practical implementation of the Action Plan, and progress of transformations that would also be perceptible abroad, should open the way to the phase of association.

It would be useful already at this point to consider an "enhanced" formula of the Action Plan for Ukraine and an association agreement - so as not to waste the enthusiasm at the promise of significant changes in that country.

As in the case of several other post-communist countries, a convincing prospect of Union membership would be a powerful pro-reform factor. The value of the EU to Ukraine lies precisely in the potential to provide that kind of motivation. However, a clear distinction needs to be made between signals that the option exists at all - and the opening of the process of negotiations, which at this time would be irresponsible and unproductive.

In any case, it is easier to identify certain prerequisites for opening the prospect of membership, than to determine the date when that could happen. These conditions include:

-fulfillment by Ukraine of the Copenhagen criteria - and persuasion of all the EU members that that has indeed been accomplished;

-an adequate level and rate of Ukraine's economic development, in conditions of internal and external stability, including energy and raw material security, and resolved infrastructure issues along its borders;

-acquiescence by Russia - as the regional power, or the willingness of the EU and Ukraine to ignore any opposition by Russia. Moscow's consent certainly is not a formal criterion. Moscow does not have the right to veto the enlargement of European security institutions. Still, it is conceivable that it would protest Ukraine's impending membership if by that time the EU had acquired the character of a defensive-military alliance. The "old" EU is not likely to take any steps in the foreseeable future that could lead to serious conflict with Russia, especially since the declarations by the Russian president that he does not oppose possible EU membership for Ukraine should be seen as a tactical maneuver;

-endorsement by Ukraine of the fundamental strategic goals of the EU in foreign policy, security and armament control, including the control of the arms trade.

-It is conceivable that if Ukraine and the EU worked together - these conditions could be fulfilled in the not-too-distant future.

The Federal Republic of Germany is the European state which - alongside Poland and other Central European countries - is showing most interest in the Ukrainian question.

It is doubtful whether EU states will bring themselves soon to establish a special fund to support the most promising projects. The European Union merely promised to increase financial aide for Ukraine. Thus , Ukraine should not expect special treatment. However, the creation of such a fund would be viable if the donor countries - in addition to the EU - also included the US and Canada, which have sizeable Ukrainian minorities, with active and influential organizations. The idea, if it comes to fruition, could draw on the experience of the early PHARE Fund.

It would also be desirable to create under the auspices of the EU - and also the OECD - a number of smaller earmarked programs, the implementation of which would involve the respective EU countries and other states (e.g. Japan), as well as interested institutions or foundations.

It has been assumed that the eastern border of the European Union would long be fixed along the Bug River. Yet, in the case of Turkey, it was gradually realized that the talks with that country could not indefinitely keep it out of the EU. It is conceivable that the Ukraine scenario will unfold in the same way.

Both countries could get their "European perspectives", both could become strategically important to the European Union, and both could make significant contributions to the common European foreign, security and defense policies.

Ukraine, with its military and technological potential, could become an interesting partner for the Union. In fact, Kiev should treat its potential involvement in the common foreign, security and defense policy as an asset. After all, Ukrainian forces - with their experience of international operations - would be highly useful in missions sponsored by the EU. Ukraine's strategic air-transport potential and specific arms-industry capacities could also be valuable.

3 NATO and Ukraine

The prospect of Ukraine's admission to the North Atlantic Alliance may be distant - as distant as EU membership.

The institutional framework of relations (though Kiev has not applied for a Membership Action Plan) and Western-style reforms in the military distinguish Ukraine from NATO's other partners, and would make the integration of military structures relatively simple. Official declarations made by the previous leadership - along with the defense doctrine in its original version of 15th June 2004 - indicated Ukraine's intention to join NATO. However, the deficit of democracy evident in various spheres of public life, hindered deep integration with the Alliance.

NATO's reserve toward Kiev, visible during the Istanbul summit in late June 2004, indicated impatience with the policies of the then president. At the same time, it could be read as a signal to the next, democratically-elected president that the principles of future cooperation would have to be elaborated anew. The presence of the  secretary general of NATO at Yushchenko's swearing-in ceremony, and the invitation of the new president to the NATO summit on 22nd February, was obviously meant to encourage dialog.

Ukraine's present, incomplete degree of integration appears to have three causes. First - despite undeniable progress in purely military integration, the Ukrainian authorities have failed to deliver on the political criteria (including genuinely civilian control of the armed forces) that would have allowed NATO to enter into deeper cooperation with Kiev. Second - there are concerns over Moscow's possible reaction to full integration with NATO of a state that, till several years ago, was organically linked to Russia and continues to be dependant on it. Third - the perceptions of NATO by most Ukrainians, especially the older generation, have been largely shaped by Cold War Soviet propaganda.

It would be premature to expect that the new leadership will move rapidly in these three areas. Progress on such complex and sensitive issues requires recognition of their significance - along with time, consistency, and a changing of public attitudes. However, it is crucial that Ukrainian decision-makers realize that the promise of NATO membership is not part of some game - but an element of a process.

Until now, the matter of civilian control was largely restricted to declarations, with no move to elaborate ways of its introduction and enforcement. Meanwhile, the problem of civilian and democratic control over the military and security forces - in view of the criticism voiced by NATO during the last few months of Koutchma's term in office - appears more important in terms of Ukraine's NATO membership than further progress with technical and organizational reforms of the army.

The advances made in reforming the armed forces and the whole external security sector could have been more significant. Still, it could well be argued that the directions of forces development are concordant with reform guidelines in any modern state, with commitment to lighter, more mobile units.

Thanks to a review made in collaboration with NATO, the Ukrainian armed forces have elaborated a vision of their development, though funding shortages prevent the implementation of many projects.

The Ukrainian forces have become transparent to a degree to their Western partners, though they have not shed their links with Russia.

The reform has the goal of enhancing inter-operational capacity with NATO, including Poland.

There is a qualitative difference between the accession of Central European states to NATO - which was a source of controversy for several years - and the accession of Ukraine. Though in both cases Russia's significance is diminished, in the former - that applied to the Euro-Atlantic region, while in the latter - changes would have global impact, influencing the relationship between NATO and the US, Russia and even China. All the parties concerned are aware of that.

III. The Russian factor

Despite Russian declarations to the contrary, Moscow's opposition could become an obstacle on the road of Ukraine's integration with the European Union. Our Ukrainian sources feel that regardless of the extent of the changes in Ukraine, West European states will not be willing to risk a prolonged cooling of their relations with Russia. It is believed that the EU's attitudes toward Ukraine are largely determined by a third factor - Russia, and that Europe still thinks in terms of spheres of influence. Hence, some observers have wondered whether Ukraine's integration with Western security structures could (and should) be achieved in opposition to Russia, or rather - simultaneously with that of Russia.

In establishing a "special relationship" with NATO, Kiev primarily wanted to attain a similar status vis-ŕ-vis that organization as Russia. Also, when Moscow intensified its relations with Brussels, Kiev responded by seeking closer ties with the Alliance. It is likely that the new Ukrainian president will continue taking into account the Russian factor as he emphasizes his country's pro-Western orientation. Meanwhile, Moscow recently expressed interest in upgrading its relations with NATO.

The Russian factor has less impact on Ukraine's integration with the EU, than on that country's relationship with NATO. As Ukraine gains in significance for the West, there will occur a corresponding adjustment in the attitudes toward Russia, though the two countries certainly will not be put on an equal footing in Western policies. A real turning point will only come when Ukraine is admitted into Western security structures, or still earlier - when accession talks get under way.

Russia's sharp reaction to the engagement of the West, including Poland and Lithuania, on the side of democracy in Ukraine was triggered by the conviction that Ukraine belongs to the Russian sphere of influence.

It would be a simplification to claim that the Kremlin is guided by geopolitical considerations in the traditional sense. However, Moscow could try - as it has done before - to use economic leverage to influence Kiev's domestic and foreign policies. It is already insisting that Ukraine deepen its involvement in the Single Economic Area.

If Yushchenko follows a consistent and coherent policy toward Russia, he may be expected to attempt reducing Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia. However, the question remains whether that would be possible without undermining the Ukrainian economy, and how that should be conducted without making it appear an unnecessary political demonstration.

The new president may be expected to do some tough bargaining with Russia over the development of economic cooperation, and may attempt to rewrite some of the commitments concerning the Single Economic Area. Yushchenko feels that regional economic cooperation should be based on European standards. Ukraine will probably consent to a free-trade zone within the SEA (something that does not interest Russia), while refusing to join the customs and monetary union that Russia is pushing.

Yushchenko recognizes that Russia is Ukraine's strategic partner. That certainly does not signify a policy favoring Moscow. In fact, the new Ukrainian president is expected to seek - to Moscow's concern - a new formula of bilateral relations, which he has often described as being "undemocratic".

As early as 2003, the leader of Our Ukraine formulated five principles that should guide Ukraine's relations with Russia:

-there is no alternative to good-neighborliness in the relations between the two states;

-there should be mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other state;

-emphasis should be placed on economic cooperation, and instead of various politically-motivated projects of different "areas" - a free-trade zone should be established;

-political pressure and blackmail are impermissible;

-priority should be given to solving social and humanitarian problems.

A cooling of relations with Russia may be expected during the early part of Yushchenko's presidency, despite the positive climate of Yushchenko's visit to Russia (24th January) - the first he made after taking office. But pragmatism will come to the fore over the next few months. Good relations with Ukraine are in Russia's long-term interest.

Russia's policy of attempting to restore political and economic influence in the former republics of the USSR could trigger conflict between the two states. Also, a new kind of asymmetry could appear: different attitudes toward values and democracy could be superimposed, at least temporarily, on the non-partner-like relationship.

There is worry in Russia - and hope elsewhere - that the Orange Revolution could spread to other countries of the CIS, and even Russia itself.

The victory of the Orange Revolution could find its echoes in Belarus, and make an impact on developments in Moldova - including the resolution of the problem of Transdniestria (especially in conjunction with Romania's entry into NATO and its expected accession to the EU in 2007).

Russia's attitude to a free Ukraine will reveal its leadership's understanding of democratic values and the right of neighboring countries to self-determination.

IV. The role of Poland

It would be interesting to find out whether any Polish government institution, academic center, strategic studies institute or foundation concerned with foreign policy had predicted the developments in Ukraine.

Generally, analysts underestimated the people of Ukraine - who authored one the most magnificent political feats in Eastern Europe. It can only be regretted that prior policies toward Ukraine did not make adequate provisions for the political opposition.

The Polish debate on Ukraine also failed to anticipate the  depth of political polarization that surfaced during the Orange Revolution and could yet divide the society.

There was a certain duality in Poland's approach to the presidential election. On the one hand, neither of the two candidates - Viktor Yanukovich or Viktor Yushchenko - was shown formal preference, so as to ensure respect for the basic European standard that the democratic choice of the people must be respected. On the other hand, Polish policy left no doubt as to which candidate enjoyed its support : the candidate who had embraced European values and wanted integration with the Euro-Atlantic community.

The official Polish policy was concordant with the public expressions of pro-Ukrainian solidarity, and generally - with the attitudes of the political parties, including those in the opposition. Polish Members of Parliament and other politicians issued unprecedented declarations, and made visits to Ukraine; they included the president of the Euro-Atlantic Association and other members of the organization.

Many Poles see Ukraine as a geo-political counterweight to Russia, which is even suspected of neo-imperial inclinations.

There is no doubt that Ukraine remains Poland's strategic partner, because as long as it remains independent, reintegration of the post-Soviet space - with its unpredictable consequences - is not viable.

The Polish support for Kiev's democratization and pro-Western course is likely to exact a cost in our relations with Russia, but also - with some EU states. It is a price we should be prepared to pay. However, it is essential to tread with care and maintain a fine balance between our priorities: those in the East, where we want to prevent the reintegration of the post-Soviet space under the aegis of Russia, and those - obvious in their general parameters - that we pursue in the framework of the EU and NATO. Any conflict with Russia should be minimized so that it does not threaten regional stability, while differences with West European states should be kept from undermining our interests in the European Union and NATO.

The Polish policy on Ukraine - while building on what has been achieved in bilateral relations and promoting Ukraine's progressing integration with the West - could find itself confronted by various dilemmas rooted in the complicated play of interests within the transatlantic community.

It would be desirable for Poland to preserve the consensus on Ukraine that has emerged out of the euphoria over the developments in that country, even though various contradictions are also likely to appear in connection with Ukraine.

The authors of this report feel that the Polish foreign service - invoking the constitutional prerogatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - should become more assertive in its role as coordinator of the policy toward Kiev and toward other partners seeking integration of a democracy-oriented Ukraine with the West.

Can we assume, as some Polish commentators have predicted, that after the initial outpouring of enthusiasm over Polish support has passed, Kiev will primarily base its long-term pro-Western strivings on Poland? That is doubtful. However, it is possible, as was the case with Lithuania, that Poland will be able to provide good services in support of Ukraine's European aspirations.

Since Poland has the ambition of playing the role of Ukraine's "advocate", it would be advisable if the policy addressed to that country - and the East of Europe in general - was supported by a better coordination of information exchange between and deeper analysis by the interested institutions in Poland.

Also, the future policy toward Ukraine, as well as Belarus, Russia and Moldova, should rely to a greater extent on non-official contacts - particularly between academic communities, youth and NGOs - since that would promote advancement of the civil society in all those countries.

Poland, committed to helping Ukraine in its democratization and development of an independent foreign and security policy, must ensure that its policy is not addressed exclusively to the political and intellectual elite. Poland and Ukraine have never had a comparable opportunity to initiate genuine reconciliation - which in itself constitutes a great value, moving both countries closer to their security-policy goals.

A key question confronting Polish foreign and security policy is: can our country - assuming it manages to retain its leading role in the West's policy toward Ukraine, which by no means is certain - persuade the Western partners that they should tie their interests with Ukraine?

Poland should consistently keep the Ukrainian issue on the political agenda in its diverse international contacts - both bilateral, regional and within integration bodies.

Ukraine - treated as a state with a great future economic, political and military potential - constitutes a profound challenge for the European Union, which is building its identity through a common foreign, security and defense policy. At the same time, it must be remembered that Ukraine's association with and ultimate membership in the EU can be attained only gradually, in stages. Therefore, pragmatism is required in implementing a vision of a Ukraine that is close to the West. Poland will have to elaborate a "golden compromise" - that is a package of practical measures proposed to our partners in Brussels, that would:

-be possible to push through the Union decision-making bodies;

-be received by the Ukrainian public opinion as realistic and satisfying;

-have practical impact on the process of Ukraine's approximation with the EU;

-be compatible with Polish interests (which is not an issue at present, but could turn out to be a serious problem in the future - especially if it reflected on the policy of cohesion);

-elaborate criteria (such as the Copenhagen criteria of membership), after the fulfillment of which Ukrainians could enter the EU without visas;

-recognize Ukraine as a market economy:

-support Ukraine's bid for WTO membership;

-introduce a scholarship program for young Ukrainians, including political and business leaders, giving them access to European colleges. The program (possible name: "Socrates-Mohyla") would have to be broad-ranging and have secure financing.

Ukraine expects increased assistance by Poland in the modernization of its armed forces. Accordingly, Poland should:

-continue supporting Ukraine in the North Atlantic Alliance and on the international forum, if necessary invoking the principle of "open doors";

-persuade the allies that an MAP should be elaborated for Ukraine, to distinguish it even further from other states cooperating with NATO in the CIS area and help it approximate membership standards;

-continue playing an advisory role with regard to attainment of NATO standards, inter-operational capacity - also in foreign missions and armed forces reform;

-present integration with NATO as enhancing democratization and technological development;

-share its experience as a host nation (HNS);

-help Ukrainian think-tanks and NGOs in organizing information campaigns about the Alliance , its political role, principles of integration, civilian control of the armed forces, so as to augment knowledge, reduce distrust and improve the image of NATO (also among the population of eastern Ukraine);

-consider ways of more a attractive presentation of the Alliance, addressed to opinion-makers and youth;

-upgrade the cooperation of higher military schools, particularly National Defense Academies, through organization of joint seminars;

-establish collaboration with regional media, also in the eastern part of Ukraine;

-initiate broader cooperation between organizations in different parts of Western, Central and Eastern Europe (including Belarus and Russia), and America.

There is no alternative from the Polish point of view to supporting Ukraine's progress on the path to democracy, as well as the political and military structures of the Western world.